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博士学位论文

制度演化的逻辑

——基于认知进化与主体间性的考察

The Logic of Institutional Evolution:  
Based on Mentality Evolution and Intersubjectivity

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## 论文摘要

本文试图在制度经济学已有成就的基础上,通过自己的研究消除制度经济学中存留的各种不能回答的尴尬和悖论,如“唯理主义的制度悖论”以及“哈耶克悖论”等,并最终解开“制度之谜”。为此,本文采用了跨学科交叉的研究方法,引进了物理学领域从牛顿力学到经典热力学的成果、生物学领域的达尔文进化论和奥菲克的人脑进化理论、哲学领域的主体间性哲学认识论等,从认知进化和主体间性两个角度的考察出发,指明了既有制度分析范式的缺陷及其必要转向,并在演化思维的指导下,通过对“制度与理性”这一核心命题的考察,对制度演化的内部逻辑给予了探索。

本文认为,制度分析的主要分歧表现为两个方面:一是表现为以牛顿静力学为支撑的封闭性制度均衡观和复杂科学所支撑的开放性制度演化观的分歧;二是表现为达尔文进化论支撑的无意识演化与奥菲克人脑进化论和广义进化论所支撑的有意识演化的分歧。本文主张,制度演化分析必须实现一种两阶段的范式转换:一是从制度均衡观转向制度演化观;二是从制度的无意识演化转向制度的有意识演化。通过认知进化与主体间性两个视角的考察,本文指出,在商业交换这一互动行为的推动下,随着人类大脑的进化,其认知能力逐步提升,对制度演化的参与性提高,并有意识地推动制度演化的进程。这种以主体间性方式存在的有限理性参与制度演化的实现过程,在制度演化进程中表现为以下具体过程:即从个人认知形成个人习惯,通过主体间性的互动形成习俗,从习俗硬化为惯例,最后经由宏观群体层面的理性参与形成正式制度和法律。

本文在分析结论中指出,目前制度研究的最大障碍来自于人们对于理性这一人类动因及其限度的误解。我们需要这样一种关于制度演化分析的正确认识:即我们似乎不得不在演化与自由之间建立一种等式,而不是在控制与自由之间建立一种等式。后者作为一种对于理性的“致命的自负”,可能是我们有效认识和利用制度时所面临的真正障碍和内在限度。

**关键词:** 制度演化; 认知进化; 主体间性

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## **Abstract**

Based on the foregone achievements of Institutional Economics(IE), this dissertation tries to disentwine the brainteaser of institution, and eliminates those embarrassments and contradictions in IE, as contradictions of rationalism and contradictions of Hayek's theory. For that, this dissertation adopts an inter-disciplinarity study method. Through introducing the new achievements and methodology veer from physics, biology and philosophy, such as the development from Newtonian Mechanics to Thermodynamics in physics, the development from Darwinism to Haim Ofek's mentality evolution theory, and the epistemology veer from subjectivity to intersubjectivity in philosophy. From the visual angle of mentality evolution and intersubjectivity, this dissertation demonstrates the disfigurement and doomed veer of foregone IE Methodology. Based on the guidance of evolution thought, it explores the inner logic of institution evolution through reviewing the core problem which represents as "institution and reason".

This dissertation considers that the main divarication of institution analysis fastens on the next two aspects: the first one is the divarication between close equilibrium view based on Newtonian Mechanics and open evolution view based on Complexity Science; the second one is the divarication between unconscious evolution based on Darwinism and conscious evolution based on Ofek's mentality evolution theory. This dissertation believes that institutional evolution analysis needs a two-steps methodology veer: the first veer is from equilibrium view to evolution view; the second veer is from unconscious evolution view to conscious evolution view. From the visual angle of mentality evolution and intersubjectivity, this dissertation indicates that human mentality

evolution have been driving forward by commercial exchange ,which is the perfection of interactional behavior. Along with the mentality evolution, the ability of human cognition is advancing, so that human can impel the institutional evolution process consciously. The bounded rationality participates institutional evolution course under the condition of intersubjectivity, and its achieving process unfurls in the following idiographic course: originally, personal usage formed ground on personal cognition; then, personal usage evolves to colony custom ground on intercourse; after a longer period, colony custom stiffens to convention; at last, when most of social members realize the function of order, people will constitute formal institution and law with their episteme according to spontaneous order.

This dissertation concludes that the most intractable hindrance for institution analysis comes from the misapprehension of reason and its bound, because it works like an outsider for the evolution course besides the compressive stress of nature and social choice. We need to build up a right attitude towards the institution analysis: Namely, it seems that we have to build up an equation between evolution and liberty, but not between control and liberty. As the result of ‘fatal conceit’, the latter is the real obstacle and inner bound when we try to availably realize and utilize institution.

**Keywords:** Institution Evolution; Mentality Evolution;  
Intersubjectivity.



# 目 录

导 论.....	1
第 1 章 研究背景及理论定位 .....	9
1.1 制度分析的经济意义 .....	9
1.2 制度为什么重要 .....	13
1.3 制度的经济解释 .....	16
1.4 制度分析与经济转轨 .....	23
1.4.1 转轨改革引发的制度分析难题.....	25
1.5 制度演化分析的目的及理论意义 .....	31
1.5.1 从结果均衡收敛到过程演化分岔的考察.....	32
1.5.2 探寻制度演化的逻辑.....	35
1.5.3 制度演化分析的现实意义.....	37
第 2 章 OIE 与 NIE 制度分析的比较及演化范式溯源 .....	39
2.1 制度分析的两种范式：OIE 与 NIE.....	40
2.1.1 OIE 的制度分析 .....	40
2.1.2 NIE 的制度分析 .....	42
2.1.3 比较与评价.....	46
2.2 制度演化分析的范式回归：从制度演化分析到哈耶克再到凡勃伦 .....	49
2.2.1 凡勃伦的制度思想及其范式.....	51
2.2.2 哈耶克之“自发扩展秩序”原理.....	54
2.2.3 制度演化分析的范式溯源：从形式化哈耶克到复兴凡勃伦.....	57
2.3 小 结.....	63
第 3 章 制度分析的范式转换及背景知识 .....	65
3.1 制度分析范式的第一个转换：从新古典的结果均衡到过程演化 .....	66
3.1.1 NIE 的新古典范式：比较静态与结果均衡 .....	66
3.1.2 演化分析范式：非线性、自组织过程与系统演化.....	70
3.1.3 范式转换之动力学依据：从牛顿经典力学到热力学.....	77

3.2 制度分析范式的第二个转换：从“无意识演化”到“有意识演化” ...	81
3.2.1 基于达尔文“自然选择”的制度演化分析：无意识演化.....	82
3.2.2 华莱士之“独立证明”的启示：有意识演化.....	87
3.2.3 人脑进化研究的支撑：“参与演化过程的认知论基础” .....	89
3.3 制度演化分析的知识背景 .....	94
3.3.1 生物学类比与社会达尔文主义.....	95
3.3.2 力学的发展与复杂系统理论.....	98
3.3.3 混沌有序与自组织原理.....	102
<b>第 4 章 基础制度理论的若干问题 .....</b>	<b>104</b>
4.1 制度本体论探索：什么是制度 .....	104
4.2 制度发生学探源：制度是如何形成的 .....	113
4.3 制度的功能主义解释：分类与作用机制 .....	124
4.3.1 制度的分类.....	124
4.3.2 制度的功能.....	128
4.4 制度变迁的动力与主体：个人决策与群体决策 .....	131
4.4.1 基于个体分散决策的自发演化型制度变迁.....	132
4.4.2 基于群体决策的理性参与型制度变迁.....	134
4.5 制度的进化：制度演化的逻辑是如何展开的 .....	137
<b>第 5 章 制度与理性：对哈耶克命题的讨论 .....</b>	<b>140</b>
5.1 维系自由的秩序：自发演化的还是理性设计的 .....	142
5.1.1 自生自发秩序.....	145
5.1.2 人造的秩序与组织.....	148
5.1.3 旨在维系自由的宪法性制度安排（立法） .....	152
5.2 进化理性主义与建构理性主义 .....	156
5.3 制度进化中理性的使命与边界 .....	160
5.4 我们能“设计或创造”制度吗 .....	167
5.5 制度演化及主体性控制的认知根源 .....	171
<b>第 6 章 制度演化分析的认知进化基础 .....</b>	<b>175</b>

<b>6.1 交换倾向：人类进化的经济起源 .....</b>	<b>176</b>
6.1.1 斯密的猜测与人类进化之谜.....	176
6.1.2 斯密与达尔文的汇合.....	181
6.1.3 分工的进化涵义.....	184
6.1.4 脑的扩大与交换维度的扩展.....	188
6.1.5 脑进化对制度分析之认知论基础的启示.....	198
<b>6.2 个人认知的形成与扩散 .....</b>	<b>200</b>
6.2.1 个人认知的形成.....	201
6.2.2 行为的模仿与扩散.....	205
6.2.3 群体认知与行为模式.....	209
<b>6.3 个体与群体：主体间性 .....</b>	<b>213</b>
6.3.1 个人与群体的关系.....	215
6.3.2 主体间性的内涵及其对制度分析的意义.....	218
<b>6.4 群体（社会）系统的进化解释 .....</b>	<b>226</b>
6.4.1 系统思维与广义进化.....	227
<b>6.5 基于认知进化的制度演化 .....</b>	<b>233</b>
6.5.1 两种演化动力：选择压力与理性参与.....	235
6.5.2 两种演化形式：无意识演化与有意识演化.....	239
<b>第 7 章 自发秩序型构：无意识演化 .....</b>	<b>247</b>
<b>7.1 个人习惯的形成与互动 .....</b>	<b>248</b>
<b>7.2 自发秩序型构的四种博弈问题 .....</b>	<b>253</b>
7.2.1 协调博弈型的问题.....	255
7.2.2 囚徒困境类型的问题.....	256
7.2.3 保持不平等的问题.....	258
7.2.4 合作博弈类型的问题.....	259
<b>7.3 习俗与惯例 .....</b>	<b>263</b>
7.3.1 习俗与惯例的差别.....	263
7.3.2 自发秩序的道德功能.....	265
7.3.3 习俗与惯例的经济功能.....	267

7.4 文化的演化与自发秩序 .....	270
7.5 非正式制度的演化与驻存 .....	275
7.5.1 自发秩序的性质：凸显性与凝聚点 .....	276
7.5.2 自发秩序演化的三种效应 .....	279
<b>第 8 章 正式制度与立法：有意识演化 .....</b>	<b>285</b>
<b>8.1 人类理性参与制度演化的三种组织形式 .....</b>	<b>287</b>
8.1.1 利维坦——怪兽模式 .....	287
8.1.2 国家主义模式 .....	290
8.1.3 民主政体模式 .....	294
<b>8.2 制度化与立法的公共选择机制 .....</b>	<b>298</b>
8.2.1 一致同意规则 .....	300
8.2.2 多数票规则 .....	302
8.2.3 多数票规则的困境：投票悖论及阿罗问题 .....	305
<b>8.3 多数票规则的修正：克服投票悖论 .....</b>	<b>308</b>
8.3.1 单峰偏好与中间投票人定理 .....	308
8.3.2 投票程序控制 .....	311
8.3.3 多维选择下的选票交易及再分配效应 .....	312
<b>8.4 政党政治与代议政府中的公共选择 .....</b>	<b>314</b>
8.4.1 政党政治：政治市场的竞争模型 .....	315
8.4.2 代议政府的决策模型 .....	318
<b>8.5 终极立宪选择与宪政 .....</b>	<b>323</b>
<b>第 9 章 制度演化与人类的内在限度 .....</b>	<b>330</b>
9.1 对“演化”的广义理解 .....	331
9.2 如何理解制度演化：本文思路的提炼 .....	334
9.3 人类的内在限度及其可欲的未来 .....	339
<b>参考文献 .....</b>	<b>342</b>
<b>后 记 .....</b>	<b>352</b>

# Content

<b>Introduction.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Chapter 1 Disquisitive Backgroune and Theoretics Orientation.....</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>1.1 Economic Significance of Institution Analysis .....</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>1.2 Why Institutions are Important.....</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>1.3 Economic Annotation of Institution .....</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>1.4 Institution Analysis &amp; Economy Tranformation.....</b>	<b>23</b>
1.4.1 Institution Conundrum In System Change.....	25
<b>1.5 Objective and Academic Significance of Institutional Evolution Analysis(IEA) .</b>	<b>31</b>
1.5.1 Changing Review Point: from Result Equilibrium to Process Evolution .....	32
1.5.2 Exploring the Logic of Institution Evolution.....	35
1.5.3 Realistic Signification of Institutional Evolution Analysis.....	37
<b>Chapter 2 Comparing Analysis between OIE &amp; NIE and</b>	
<b>Source-Tracing of IEA.....</b>	<b>39</b>
<b>2.1 Two Methodology of Institutional Analysis: OIE &amp; NIE .....</b>	<b>40</b>
2.1.1 Institutional Analysis of OIE .....	40
2.1.2 Institutional Analysis of NIE .....	42
2.1.3 Comparison and Comments.....	46
<b>2.2 Methodology Recursion of IEA: From IEA to Hayek then to Veblen ...</b>	<b>49</b>
2.2.1 Institutional Methodology and Thoughts of Veblen .....	51
2.2.2 Hayek's Constitution of Liberty.....	54
2.2.3 Methodology Recursion of IEA.....	57
<b>2.3 Summary.....</b>	<b>63</b>
<b>Chapter 3 IE Methodology Transition and Background Knowledge .....</b>	<b>65</b>
<b>3.1 The First Methodology Transition: From Equilibrium View to Evolution View... </b>	<b>66</b>
3.1.1 Methodology of NIE: Comparative Quiescence and Result Equilibrium.	66
3.1.2 Methodology of IEA: Nonlinear、Self-organizing and Systemic Evolution .	70
3.1.3 Dynamics Evedence of Methodology Transition: From Newtonian	

Mechanics to Thermodynamics .....	77
<b>3.2 The First Methodology Transition: From Unconscious Evolution to Conscious Evolution.....</b>	<b>81</b>
3.2.1 IEA Based on Darwinism: Unconscious Evolution .....	82
3.2.2 IEA Based on Wallace's Independently Testify: Conscious Evolution .....	87
3.2.3 Support from Brain Evolution Theory: Epistemology Basic of Rational Participating .....	89
<b>3.3 Background Knowledge of IEA .....</b>	<b>94</b>
3.3.1 Biological Analogism and Social Darwinism .....	95
3.3.2 Development of Mechanics and Complex Systems Theory .....	98
3.3.3 Order Chaos and Self-organized Principle.....	102
<b>Chapter 4 Problems of Basic Institution Theory .....</b>	<b>104</b>
<b>4.1 Ontology of Institution: What is Institution .....</b>	<b>104</b>
<b>4.2 Academicism of Institution: How does Institution Organized.....</b>	<b>113</b>
<b>4.3 Functionalism of Institution: Taxonomy and Function Mechanism ...</b>	<b>124</b>
4.3.1 Classification of Institution.....	124
4.3.2 Function of Institution.....	128
<b>4.4 Motivity and Subjectivity of Institutional Change: Individual Decision1 and Colony Decision .....</b>	<b>131</b>
4.4.1 Spontaneous Order Based on Dispersive Individual Decision .....	132
4.4.2 Formal Institution and Law Based on Colony Decision.....	134
<b>4.5 Institutional Evolution: How does the Logic of Institutional Evolution extend ....</b>	<b>137</b>
<b>Chapter 5 Institution and Reason : A Discussion on Hayek's Proposition.....</b>	<b>140</b>
<b>5.1 Freedom-protecting Order Form: Spontaneously or Exogenously .....</b>	<b>142</b>
5.1.1 Spontaneous Order.....	145
5.1.2 Exogenously Made Order and Organization.....	148
5.1.3 Freedom-protecting Law of Constituion (Legislaiton) .....	152
<b>5.2 Evolutionary Rationlism and Constructivist Rationalism .....</b>	<b>156</b>

5.3 Role and Limitation of Reason in the process of Institution Evolving .....	160
5.4 Can We Create or Construct Institution.....	167
5.5 Institutional Evolution and Cognition Foundation for Subjective Control .....	171
<b>Chapter 6 The Basic of Mentality Evolution for IEA.....</b>	<b>175</b>
6.1 The Nature of Exchange: Economy Origin of Human Evolution.....	176
6.1.1 Smith's Guess and The Brainteaser of Human Evolution.....	176
6.1.2 Convergence of Smith and Darwin .....	181
6.1.3 The Evolution Meaning of Labor Division.....	184
6.1.4 Brain Expanding and Market Extending.....	188
6.1.5 The Apocalypse to The Basic of IEA from Mentality Evolution.....	198
6.2 Form and Diffusion of Individual Cognition.....	200
6.2.1 The Process of Individual Cognition Form.....	201
6.2.2 Imitation and Diffusion of Behavior .....	205
6.2.3 Colony Cognition and Behavior Mode .....	209
6.3 Individual and Colony: Intersubjectivity.....	213
6.3.1 Hypotaxis of Individual and Colony .....	215
6.3.2 Connotation of Intersubjectivity and Its apocalypse to IEA.....	218
6.4 An Evolutionary annotation for Social Evolution.....	226
6.4.1 Systemic Thought and Broad Sense of Evolution .....	227
6.5 Institution Evolution Based on Mentality Evolution .....	233
6.5.1 Two Motivity for Evolution: Natural Selection and Reason Participation..	235
6.5.2 Two form of Evolution: Unconscious Evolution and Conscious Evolution..	239
<b>Chapter 7 Spontaneous Order Forming: Unconscious Evolution.....</b>	<b>247</b>
7.1 Individual Custom Forming and Interaction .....	248
7.2 Four Game Situation in Which Spontaneous Order Formed .....	253
7.3 Consuetude and Convention .....	263
7.4 Spontaneous Order and Culture Evolution.....	270
7.5 Evolution and retainment of Informal Institution .....	275
7.5.1 Character of Spontaneous Order: Prominence and Focal Point.....	276

7.5.2 Three domino effect of Spontaneous Order Evolution.....	279
<b>Chapter 8 Institutionalization and Legislation: conscious Evolution....</b>	<b>285</b>
<b>8.1 Three tectologys for Reason Participating.....</b>	<b>287</b>
8.1.1 Leviathan--Monster Mode .....	287
8.1.2 Nationalism Mode.....	290
8.1.3 Democratic Mode.....	294
<b>8.2 The Collective Mechanism of Institutionalization and Legislation .....</b>	<b>298</b>
8.2.1 Rule for Unanimity or Full Consensus .....	300
8.2.2 Rule fo rMajority Voting .....	302
8.2.3 Puzzledom of Majority Voting Rule .....	305
<b>8. 3 Amelioration of Majority Voting Rule: Surmount the Paradox of Voting .....</b>	<b>308</b>
8.3.1 Single-apex Preference and The Median Voter Theorem .....	308
8.3.2 Controlling the Procedure of Voting .....	311
8.3.3 Vote-trading and Redistribution under Multidimensional Preference.....	312
<b>8.4 The Collective Mechanism Party Politics and Representative Government.....</b>	<b>314</b>
8.4.1: Competition Mode for Political Market.....	315
8.4.2 Decision-making Mode for Representative Government .....	318
<b>8.5 Ultimate Constitutionality Choice and Constitutionalism .....</b>	<b>323</b>
<b>Chapter 9 Institution Evolution and The Intrinsic limitation for Human-being .....</b>	<b>330</b>
<b>9.1 An General Understanding about Evolution.....</b>	<b>331</b>
<b>9.2 How to understand Institution Evolution: A Refinement on This Dissertation ..</b>	<b>334</b>
<b>9.3 The Intrinsic limitation for Human-being and Our Expectable Future .....</b>	<b>339</b>
<b>References .....</b>	<b>342</b>
<b>Postscript .....</b>	<b>352</b>



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